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perspective	 that	might	 eventually	 be	 called	 the	 “view	 from	without”)?	By	






















Closely	 related	 to	 the	 topic	of	 social	cognition	 is	 interpersonality	or	 inter-
subjectivity (which,	 in	 the	view	of	 the	 editor,	 form	a	unitary	 field	because	
none	of	them	can	be	explained	without	recourse	to	the	other),	which	receives	





































































tion.	Following	Davidson,	Naomi	Eilan	concludes	that	thought is essentially 
social.

















































































































In	 “Inference	 or	 Familiarity?	 The	 Embodied	 Roots	 of	 Social	 Cognition,” 
Massimiliano L. Cappuccio	 criticizes	 those	 intellectualistic	 theories	 of	 so-
cial	cognition	that	base	understanding	on	mind-reading	and	meta-theoretical	
representations.	He	outlines	own	concept	of	 the	 “embodied	 familiarity	hy-
pothesis,”	which	claims	that	we	can	make	sense	of	the	intention	underlying	
another’s	movements	on	 the	basis	of	our	direct	acquaintance	with	 them.	 It	
requires	involvement	of	one’s	embodied	dispositions	(i.e.,	direct	sensorimo-
tor	experience),	which	allows	a	co-agent	to	understand	the	observed	action’s	
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